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INTRODUCTION
The equitable doctrine of laches can bar the infringement
claim1 of a copyright owner who “acquiesces in a transaction and
sleeps upon his rights,”2 a derivation of the ancient maxim, “equity
aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.”3 To assert a
successful laches defense, a “defendant must prove both an
unreasonable delay by the plaintiff and prejudice to itself.”4 The
viability of a laches defense hinges on a “mixed question of law
and fact.”5 While it is not a “purely factual question requiring no
knowledge of law to answer,” courts assess laches based on the
facts surrounding a claim. 6 Before 1957, defendants invoked
laches in copyright infringement claims brought against them
within the applicable state statute of limitations provisions when
plaintiffs delayed in bringing an action. 7 In 1957, Congress
enacted a three-year statute of limitations for civil copyright

1

17 U.S.C.A. § 501 (2012).
S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 500 (1919) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (citing
Hayward v. Eliot Nat’l Bank, 96 U.S. 611 (1877)).
3
Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 797–98 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citing Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 259 (2d Cir. 1997)).
4
Couveau v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000).
5
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (citing Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d
925, 937 (7th Cir. 1984)).
6
Id.
7
See, e.g., Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888); Machaty v. Astra Pictures, 197
F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1952); Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933);
Werner Co. v. Encyclopedia Britannica Co., 134 F. 831 (3d Cir. 1905); Greenbie v.
Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Edward B Marks Music Corp v. Wonnell, 61 F.
Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); W. Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909).
2
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claims 8 to establish “highly desirable” national uniformity. 9
Several circuits consider the application of the judicially created
doctrine of laches “in tension with Congress[ional] intent.”10
Since 2001, a severe split has existed across the circuits over
the availability of laches in infringement claims initiated within the
Copyright Act’s statute of limitations. 11 The Ninth Circuit
permitted laches. 12 The Fourth Circuit did not. 13 The Second
Circuit allowed equitable defenses to bar some remedies detailed
in the Copyright Act, but not others. 14 The Sixth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits deferred to the federal statute of limitations,
except in certain “compelling,” 15 “extraordinary,” 16 or “rare” 17
cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Petrella v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc., a Ninth Circuit case in which MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios asserted a laches defense against Paula
Petrella’s infringement claim over the book and two screenplays
that served as the basis for the film Raging Bull. 18 The Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case to the
District Court.19 In a majority opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the
Court held that laches cannot preclude a claim for legal relief
brought within the statute of limitations, but may bar equitable
relief in “extraordinary circumstances.” 20 The recent Petrella
decision effectively resolves the circuit split over the availability of
8
See Act of Sept. 7, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-313, 71 Stat. 633 (reenacted without
alteration in the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2586 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 507(b))).
9
S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1962.
10
Petrella, 695 F.3d at 958.
11
See, e.g., id.; Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters.
Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227
(6th Cir. 2007); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 2002); Lyons
P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001); New Era Publ’ns
Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).
12
See Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 956 (9th Cir. 2001).
13
See Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 806.
14
See New Era Publ’ns Int’l, 873 F.2d at 584–85.
15
Chirco, 474 F.3d at 233.
16
Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1320.
17
Jacobsen, 287 F.3d at 951.
18
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2012).
19
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, 2014 WL 2011574 (U.S. May
19, 2014).
20
Id. at *4.
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laches, while delineating when defendants may invoke the
equitable defense.
Part I evaluates the availability of laches in copyright
infringement claims brought within the Copyright Act’s statute of
limitations before the Petrella decision. Part I examines how
courts determine if a defendant sufficiently evidences the elements
of laches to assert a viable defense. To provide context, Part I
traces the application of laches both before and after the 1957
adoption of the statute of limitations. Acknowledging the tension
between a judicially created doctrine and a congressionally created
statute, Part I explains how courts decide the availability of laches
in a copyright case, given the statute of limitations. Finally, Part I
addresses the severe circuit split in the United States court of
appeals system over the availability of laches.
Part II elucidates the underlying reasons for the conflicts over
the availability of laches. Supreme Court decisions applying
equitable doctrines in cases involving federally codified statutes
provide reasoning for both those in favor of the availability of
laches in copyright claims and those opposed. Translating this
reasoning into Copyright law, Part II analyzes the tension arising
from the interpretations among the circuits of the availability of
laches, given the remedial purpose of the Copyright Act and
Congress’s particular purpose of creating a national uniformity in
amending the Act to include a statute of limitations. Part II
distinguishes the conflicts surrounding the availability of laches in
copyright cases involving discrete acts of infringement from the
conflicts in claims arising from continuing acts of infringement.
Finally, Part II presents the conflicts over addressing equitable
considerations in cases guided by the bright-line law of statutory
provisions.
Part III offers an alternative resolution to the conflict in the
United States court of appeals system over the availability of
laches in copyright infringement claims brought within the statute
of limitations. Part III draws on the reasoning in National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, which differentiated the
availability of equitable defenses for discrimination claims based
on discrete acts from hostile work environment claims based on
repeated conduct, to suggest a framework by which the Court may

856

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:851

proceed. Specifically, Part III suggests that the Supreme Court, in
deciding Petrella, should have distinguished between cases
involving discrete acts of infringement from those arising from
continuing acts of infringement to resolve the conflict between the
various circuits restricting laches, which commonly address
discrete acts of infringement, and the presumption in favor of
laches in the Ninth Circuit, which more frequently encounters
continuing acts of infringement.
I. THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF LACHES IN COPYRIGHT LAW
BEFORE PETRELLA V. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER
A. The Elements of Laches
For a defendant to assert a viable laches defense, the plaintiff
must delay in filing suit. 21 Courts measure the period of delay
from “the time that the plaintiff knew or should have known about
the potential claim at issue,”22 until a plaintiff initiates litigation.23
A plaintiff’s knowledge of “the existence of the rights” is
necessary, “for there can be no laches in failing to assert rights of
which a party is wholly ignorant, and whose existence he had no
reason to apprehend.”24 Actual notice or when a plaintiff “would
have reasonably been expected to inquire about the subject matter”
starts the delay period. 25 The starting point for laches will, at
times, differ from the starting point for the statute of limitations,
which states that “[n]o civil action shall be maintained . . . unless it
is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”26 The
statute of limitations is triggered only by the accrual of actual
infringements, while the delay period in laches “may be triggered
when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know about an impending
infringement.”27 The delay sufficient to constitute laches begins
21

See Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 952 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. (citing Kling v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2000)).
23
See Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 952 (citing Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir.
1994)).
24
Kling, 225 F.3d at 1036 (citing Halstead v. Grinnan, 152 U.S. 412, 417 (1894)).
25
See id. at 1036 (citing Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc.,
988 F.2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
26
17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012).
27
Kling, 225 F.3d at 1038.
22
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when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of an actual or
intended infringing act.
The delay must be unreasonable to constitute laches.28 Courts
look to the cause of the delay to determine if it is unreasonable.29
Delay is reasonable when it is necessitated by “the exhaustion of
remedies through the administrative process;”30 when its purpose is
“to evaluate and prepare a complicated claim;”31 and when it is
used “to determine whether the scope of proposed infringement
will justify the cost of litigation.” 32 Courts consider delay
unreasonable when the plaintiff intends on “capitaliz[ing] on the
value of the alleged infringer’s labor, by determining whether the
infringing conduct will be profitable.”33 Courts do not tether the
reasonableness of delay to the actual time elapsed, though time is
often one significant factor. The Second Circuit in Haas v. Leo
Feist held “[a] few weeks’ delay in the case of a song so
ephemeral . . . may have the same effect as 16 years, when the
publication is a legal encyclopedia in 30 volumes.” 34 The
reasonableness of a delay depends on its cause, as well as the time
elapsed.
The unreasonable delay must result in prejudice to the
defendant. 35 Courts recognize both evidentiary prejudice and
expectations-based prejudice in laches. 36 Evidentiary prejudice
encompasses “lost, stale, or degraded evidence” and “witnesses
whose memories have faded or who have died.”37 Expectationsbased prejudice requires a defendant to show that it “took actions
28

See Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 954.
See id.
30
Id. (citing Couveau v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2000)).
31
Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 954 (citing Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 831 F. Supp.
202, 219 (D. Mass. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.1995), aff’d, 516
U.S. 233 (1996)).
32
Id. at 954.
33
Id. (citing Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)).
34
Haas, 234 F. at 108; see discussion infra Part I.B.
35
See Hoste v. Radio Corp. of Am., 654 F.2d 11, 12 (6th Cir. 1981).
36
See Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 955.
37
Id. (citing Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 889–90 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Trs. for
Alaska Laborers–Constr. Indus. Health & Sec. Fund v. Ferrell, 812 F.2d 512, 518 (9th
Cir. 1987); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 202, 220 (D. Mass.
1993), rev’d on other grounds, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.1995), aff’d, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
29
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or suffered consequences” it may have avoided, had the plaintiff
initiated litigation without unreasonable delay.38
Courts determine expectations-based prejudice by balancing
the effects of the delay in light of the circumstances surrounding a
claim:
If only a short period of time has elapsed since the
accrual of the claim, the magnitude of the prejudice
required before the suit should be barred is great,
whereas if the delay is lengthy, prejudice is more
likely to have occurred and less proof of prejudice
will be required.39
A defendant can establish expectations-based prejudice by
showing that, for example, “during the delay, it invested money to
expand its business or entered into business transactions based on
[its] presumed rights.” 40 Prejudice can result from the “coming
into existence of business plans and relationships based on reliance
on the state of affairs challenged by the claims of the litigation.”41
Though reliance is typically associated with equitable estoppel,42
the potential economic effect of a plaintiff’s unreasonable delay on
a defendant’s business concerns satisfies the prejudice element of
laches.
B. The Application of Laches in Copyright Infringement Cases
Courts have applied laches in copyright cases in several
circuits, both before and after the 1957 adoption of the Copyright
Act’s statute of limitations. In Gilmore v. Anderson, the court
38
See Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 955 (citing Jackson, 25 F.3d at 889); Russell v. Price, 612
F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1979); Lotus, 831 F. Supp. at 220.
39
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (citing Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975,
1000 (9th Cir. 2006)).
40
Id. (citing Miller, 454 F.3d at 999).
41
Id. (citing HOWARD B. ABRAMS, LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 13:48 (2011)).
42
See Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Const. Toys, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 75, 81 (D. Conn.
2012) (“A copyright defendant invoking equitable estoppel must show that (1) the
plaintiff had knowledge of the defendant’s infringing acts, (2) the plaintiff either intended
that the defendant rely on his acts or omissions or failed to act in such a manner that the
defendant had a right to believe that it was intended to rely on the plaintiff’s conduct, (3)
the defendant was ignorant of the true facts, and (4) the defendant relied on the plaintiff’s
conduct to its detriment.” (citation omitted)).
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considered the effects of delay in assessing if equity should bar the
claim.43 The suit concerned the copyright of The Life of James A.
Garfield, written by James R. Gilmore under the name of Edmund
Kirke and alleged infringement by From Canal-Boy to President,
written by defendant Horatio Alger, and published by defendant
John R. Anderson. 44 Harper & Bros. acquired the book’s
copyright in 1880. 45 Anderson published the book in 1881. 46
Harper & Bros. assigned the copyright to Laura E. Gilmore in
1886. 47 Though the defendants did not claim that a statute of
limitations barred recovery, “the lapse of time is said to meet the
equity, if any, of the [plaintiff’s] case.” 48 The court found the
“conduct of the defendants has not been induced, nor their liability
varied, by anything done or omitted to be done by those interested
in the copyright” and thus “[n]othing is apparent adequate to cut
off any right accrued.”49 Delay absent prejudice does not bar a
claim.
Judge Learned Hand provided an oft-cited justification for the
application of equitable doctrines to copyright claims in the Haas
opinion.50 Harry Haas brought the case against Leo Feist, Inc. over
infringement of a copyrighted song, “You Will Never Know How
Much I Really Cared.”51 Composed in the spring of 1914, the song
was a failure upon its release, selling only 1,000 copies.52 William
Cahalin, a co-author of “You Will Never Know How Much I
Really Cared,” heard a song composed by Al Piantadosi entitled, “I
Didn’t Raise My Boy To Be A Soldier” in December of 1914 and
“at once was struck with the similarity between the chorus of
Piantadosi’s song and Haas’s, but said nothing at the time.” 53
Later that month, Feist began the publicity campaign for “I Didn’t
43

Gilmore v. Anderson, 38 F. 846, 848 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889).
Id. at 847.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 848.
49
Id. (citing Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888)) (discussing the application of
laches in a trademark case).
50
234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
51
Id. at 106.
52
Id.
53
Id.
44
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Raise My Boy To Be A Soldier,” placing advertisements in
newspapers all over the country.54 Haas first heard the song in
January of 1915 and he recognized the similarity between the
choruses.55 Haas did nothing until March, when he consulted a
lawyer, who brought suit on January 28, 1916, when the song “had
long since run its course.” 56 The court precluded the plaintiffs
from recovering profits accrued after the date on which they had
knowledge of the infringement.57 The court’s reasoning appears in
the holdings for applying equitable defenses to copyright
infringement claims in several jurisdictions:58
It must be obvious to every one familiar with
equitable principles that it is inequitable for the
owner of a copyright, with full notice of an intended
infringement, to stand inactive while the proposed
infringer spends large sums of money in its
exploitation, and to intervene only when his
speculation has proved a success. Delay under such
circumstances allows the owner to speculate
without risk with the other’s money; he cannot
possibly lose, and he may win.59
The concurring opinion in the Ninth Circuit’s Petrella decision
identified this passage as “a classic invocation of equitable
estoppel, which is distinct from its equitable cousin, laches.” 60
However, the unreasonable delay and resulting expectations-based
prejudice correspond to the elements of laches, which are easier to
satisfy than the elements of equitable estoppel.61

54

Id.
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 108.
58
See, e.g., Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l,
533 F.3d 1287, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227,
232 (6th Cir. 2007); Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 2001).
59
Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
60
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2012) (Fletcher,
J., concurring) cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013).
61
See id.
55
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C. The Statute of Limitations in Copyright Infringement Cases
1. The Copyright Act’s Statute of Limitations
Prior to 1957, the Copyright Act “prescribe[d] no limitation on
the commencement of an action for infringement.” 62 In “the
absence of any Federal statute of limitations,” an action was
“limited by the limitation existing for the class of actions to which
it belongs, in the state where the action was brought.”63 Amongst
the courts it was “settled that the applicable state statute of
limitations governs.”64
In 1957, Congress amended the 1909 Copyright Act to include
a three-year statute of limitations for civil copyright claims. 65
Congress determined it “highly desirable to provide a uniform
(limitations) period throughout the United States” that would deter
forum shopping. 66 The Senate Report accompanying the
amendment addressed these forum shopping concerns, stating
“[n]aturally the makers of motion pictures and the publishers of
songs and books and other works of arts are interested in obtaining
a short statutory period while persons who might have their
copyrights infringed are interested in a longer period.”67 Congress
feared localized statutes of limitations providing disparate
treatment of copyright cases could breed forum shopping among
claimants. 68 The Senate Report specified that California had
adopted a relatively short statute of limitations “due to the
centralization of the movie industry.”69 The Senate Report noted
that states “applied longer periods for the commencement of
actions” “[w]here the incident of copyright actions is low.”70 The
possible forum shopping for copyright claims brought in different
62

Carew v. Melrose Music, 92 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 158 (1899).
64
Carew, 92 F. Supp. at 971.
65
See Act of Sept. 7, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-313, 71 Stat. 633 (reenacted without
alteration in the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 507(b))).
66
S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1962.
67
Id.
68
See Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
63
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regions led Congress to amend the Copyright Act to include a
statute of limitations.
The Senate Report addressed “various equitable situations on
which the statute of limitations is generally suspended” that federal
district courts would likely take into account.71 The Senate Report
cited the House Report in identifying some equitable
considerations, including cases “where there exist the disabilities
or [sic] insanity of [sic] infancy, absence of the defendant from the
jurisdiction, fraudulent concealment, etc.”72 Mentions of laches or
equitable estoppel were absent from this list of anticipated
equitable considerations applicable in copyright cases. The Senate
Report noted that the adoption of a federal limitations period
would extinguish equitable defenses, such as laches.73 The Senate
Report cited the House Report, which stated, “courts generally do
not permit the intervention of equitable defenses or estoppel where
there is a [statute of] limitation[s].”74 The circuit split surrounding
the availability of laches largely focuses on whether, given the
amendment in 1957, Congress intended to preclude the application
of equitable doctrines in copyright claims brought within the
statute of limitations. From the Senate Report and the House
Report, the inferred Congressional intent in amending the
Copyright Act to include the statute of limitations aimed to
establish uniformity and predictability and to preclude the
availability of equitable defenses, including laches.
2. The Continuing Wrong Doctrine, the Rolling Statute of
Limitations, and the Re-Releases Issue
Two approaches predominate for measuring infringement that
occurs over an extended period of time: the continuing wrong
doctrine and the rolling statute of limitations. The continuing
wrong doctrine, put forth in Taylor v. Meirick, holds that in a series
of infringing acts, only the last such act need occur within the
71

Id. at 3 (citing H. REP. NO. 85-150); S. REP. NO. 85-1014, reprinted in 1957
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1963).
72
S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1962 (citing
H. REP. NO. 85-150); S. REP. NO. 85-1014, reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1963.
73
See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013).
74
H. REP. NO. 85-150; S. REP. NO. 85-1014.
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three-year statutory period in order for liability to attach to all acts
of infringement.75 The initial infringing act, Meirick’s copying of
Taylor’s fishing maps of Illinois lakes, and the sales of the
resulting copies amounted to a “continuing wrong.” 76 The Ninth
Circuit, in Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 77 rejected the
holding in Taylor. 78 Under Roley, damages for infringement
claims take into account only the three years prior to filing. 79
Sutton Roley wrote a screenplay entitled Sleep Tight Little Sister,
which he gave to Walter Coblenz of New World Entertainment
Limited in hopes he would produce it.80 Coblenz declined, but two
years later, in August 1987, he invited Roley to the screening of his
new movie Sister, Sister, which Roley claimed was a production of
his screenplay.81 Roley alleged infringement after first viewing the
screening of Sister, Sister in August 1987, and argued that if any
allegedly infringing conduct occurred within the three years
preceding the filing of the action, he may reach back and sue for
damages or other relief for all allegedly infringing acts. 82 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this assertion.83 If Roley provided evidence
of continuing copyright infringements, “an action [could] be
brought for all acts that accrued within the three years preceding
the filing of the suit.”84 Claims older than three years would be
barred by the statute of limitations under the rolling statute of
limitations.85 Unreasonable delay is more likely to be present in
claims brought in courts applying the continuing wrongs approach,
as “party could, theoretically, delay filing suit indefinitely.” 86
75

Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id.
77
Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994).
78
Id.
79
Id.; see also Bruce v. Weekly World News, Inc., 310 F.3d 25, 27 n.1 (1st Cir. 2002).
80
Roley, 19 F.3d at 480.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 481.
83
Id.
84
Id. (citing Baxter v. Curtis Indus., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 100, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1962));
see also Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 61–62 (1911); Hampton v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 105 (9th Cir. 1960); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd
Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 365 (9th Cir. 1947); Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp.
1013, 1017–18 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
85
See Roley, 19 F.3d at 481.
86
Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir. 1999).
76
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Unreasonable delay is less likely to be present in claims brought in
courts that adopt the rolling statute of limitations theory, because
of the three-year window. A court’s decision to adopt either the
continuing wrongs or rolling statute of limitations approach
potentially affects the application of laches.
The Ninth Circuit addressed the statute of limitations issue
concerning re-releases in the Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp.
decision.87 The theatrical release of the films in question occurred
decades before the plaintiff brought the claim, but the defendant
began to exploit the films on DVD at a much later date. The court
posed the question, “how can it fairly be said that a lawsuit filed in
1998, relating to a DVD released in 1997 was ‘delayed’?”88 The
court held that “[w]here, as here, the allegedly infringing aspect of
the DVD is identical to the alleged infringements contained in the
underlying movie, then the two should be treated identically for
purposes of laches.” 89 The court found the “perfect overlap”
between the films as originally released and as offered decades
later on DVD tied the infringement claim over a re-release to
laches regarding the original work.90 However, the Ninth Circuit
concluded, “[t]his is not to say that every re-release must always be
treated like the original.”91 The “perfect overlap” appeared to be
the exception, not the rule: “when old works are transferred to new
media, they often are modified or adorned with new material,”
including “[c]ompact discs” with “bonus tracks” and “DVDs” with
“ʻbonus materials’ such as alternate audio commentary.” 92
Additional materials accompanying re-releases “may be separately
protectable for intellectual property purposes” and “might be
treated differently” than the underlying work “for purposes of
laches.”93 Though in Danjaq it was unnecessary to examine the
effect of additional materials in re-releases on the delay element of
laches, the Ninth Circuit recognized the issue as a common

87
88
89
90
91
92
93

263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 953.
Id. at 954.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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occurrence in future copyright infringement claims involving rereleases and potential continuing acts of infringement.
D. The Circuit Split Over the Availability of Laches in Copyright
Infringement Claims Brought Within the Statute of Limitations
1. The Fourth Circuit: Statute of Limitations is the “End of the
Matter”94
The Fourth Circuit does not allow laches for copyright
infringement claims brought within the statute of limitations.95 In
Lyons Partnership, L.P. v Morris Costumes, Inc., Lyons
Partnership owned all of the intellectual property rights to the
character “Barney.”96 Morris Costumes operated a retail costume
rental establishment.97 The complaint alleged that the defendants
rented three different forms of the costume to the public, each of
which infringed on the plaintiff’s Barney copyrights.98 Though the
district court found that two of the three costumes infringed Lyons’
copyrights, it denied Lyons a remedy because the claims were
barred by the statute of limitations and by the doctrine of laches.99
The district court held that the four-year lapse between the time
when Lyons first became aware of Morris’ acts of infringement
and the commencement date of the lawsuit amounted to an
“inexcusable” delay. 100 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court’s ruling that all of the claims were barred
by the statute of limitations and reversed the ruling that any claims
were barred by laches.101
Concerns about separation of powers frame the Fourth
Circuit’s approach to laches in federal claims. “In deference to the
doctrine of separation of powers, the [Supreme] Court has been
94

Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (see discussion infra Part II.A.1).
See Lyons P’ship, L.P. v Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 796 (4th Cir. 2001).
96
Id. at 795–96. (“Barney,” the title character of the “Barney & Friends” children’s
television show, is a fat, purple stuffed animal, “ostensibly a dinosaur.” James Gorman,
TELEVISION VIEW; Of Dinosaurs Why Must This One Thrive?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
1993.).
97
See id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 806.
95
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circumspect in adopting principles of equity in the context of
enforcing federal statutes.”102 Citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, the
Fourth Circuit posited, “[i]f Congress explicitly puts a limit upon
the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is an end of
the matter.
The Congressional statute of limitation is
103
definitive.”
The Fourth Circuit defers to statutory provisions in
completely restricting the availability of laches. The Fourth
Circuit cited other circuits to support their separation of powers
issues. The court in Lyons Partnership invoked the Second Circuit
in considering the application of laches an attempt to “overrule the
legislature’s judgment as to the appropriate time limit to apply for
actions brought under the statute.”104 The court cited to the Ninth
Circuit for “separation of powers principles” precluding the
application of laches to bar a federal statutory claim timely filed
under an express statute of limitations. 105 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that when Congress creates a cause of action for
traditional equitable remedies and specifies a statute of limitations
for that action, the federal statute for that cause of action should
govern.106
The Fourth Circuit applied the statutory deference found in
other areas of law to the Copyright Act. In the Copyright Act,
Congress created a civil cause of action by which plaintiffs may
seek both damages and injunctive relief. 107 The statute of
limitations provision states “[n]o civil action shall be maintained
under the provisions of this Title unless it is commenced within
three years after the claim accrued.”108 In Lyons Partnership, the
court held that when a provision presents an explicit time
limitation, a court is not free to shorten that period, even when a
plaintiff seeks equitable relief.109 The Fourth Circuit held that the

102

Id. at 798 (citing Oneida Cnty., N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State,
470 U.S. 226, 262 n.12 (1985)).
103
327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
104
Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1997).
105
See Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1993).
106
Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 798.
107
See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 502, 504 (2002).
108
U.S.C.A. § 507(b) (2002).
109
Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 798.
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Copyright Act’s statute of limitations controls and the laches
defense is unavailable.
2. The Eleventh Circuit: Laches Available “Only in the Most
Extraordinary Circumstances”
The Eleventh Circuit recognizes laches “only in the most
extraordinary circumstances.”110 In Peter Letterese & Associates.,
Inc. v. World Institute of Scientology Enterprises, the Eleventh
Circuit demarcated the availability of laches in copyright
infringement claims brought within the statute of limitations. 111
This case involved a dispute over copyright protection in a book
about sales techniques authored by Leslie Achilles “Les” Dane
called Big League Sales Closing Techniques.112 Peter Letterese &
Associates, Inc. (“PL&A”), the exclusive licensee of the copyright
in Dane’s book, claimed that three Church of Scientology affiliates
infringed its copyright by incorporating portions of the book into
their instructional course materials.113 PL&A sought declaratory
and injunctive relief.114 Dane knew of and participated in the use
of his book since the mid-1980s when the Church hired him to
travel to Scientology churches in the United States and abroad to
deliver seminars. 115 The seminars focused on sales techniques
found in his book that were included in the Church’s sales drills.116
The district court accepted that the infringement occurred as
alleged, but ruled for defendants, holding that Scientology’s
incorporation of the text fell under the fair use doctrine and that
PL&A’s suit was barred by laches.117 The Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in three
claims, but vacated and remanded the court’s application of the fair
use doctrine and the laches defense in the remaining claim.118
110

Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. Int’l, 533 F.3d
1287, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008).
111
Id.
112
Id. at 1293.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1294.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 1298.
118
Id. at 1293.
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The Eleventh Circuit based its presumption of availability of
laches on the Fifth Circuit’s views on the equitable doctrines in
copyright claims.119 The Fifth Circuit restricted the availability of
equitable defenses to counteract the problem of forum shopping
through a general deference to the “uniform federal period of
limitations.” 120 “In deciding that the equitable doctrine of
tolling121 nonetheless applied to a copyright infringement claim,”
the former Fifth Circuit observed, “the intent of the drafters was
that the limitations period would affect the remedy only, not the
substantive right, and that equitable considerations would therefore
apply to suspend the running of the statute.”122 Prather v. Neva
Paperbacks, Inc. held that courts “must look to general equitable
principles to determine the proper disposition” of a plaintiff’s
cause of action. 123 In allowing tolling in copyright claims, the
Fifth Circuit created a presumption that equitable doctrines,
including laches, could apply in cases with a statute of limitations.
In constricting the availability of laches, the Eleventh Circuit
looked to the principles invoked by the Fourth Circuit in barring
equitable doctrines. While stating it “cannot agree with the
conclusion of the Fourth Circuit, which is an unqualified ‘no,’” the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the Fourth Circuit’s “invocation of
separation of powers principles,” which counsel against the use of
“the judicially created doctrine of laches to bar a federal statutory
claim that has been timely filed under an express statute of
limitations.” 124 The Eleventh Circuit maintains a “strong
presumption that a plaintiff’s suit is timely if it is filed before the

119

Prior to its creation, the districts comprising the Eleventh Circuit were in the Fifth
Circuit. Fifth Circuit decisions before October 1, 1981 are binding precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit. See Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc., 533 F.3d 1287, 1293 (citing Bonner
v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)).
120
Id. at 1320 (citing Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 339 (5th Cir.
1971)).
121
“Plaintiff’s ignorance of the claim as a result of defendant’s fraudulent concealment
and plaintiff’s due diligence can constitute equitable tolling.” 1-12 MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.05 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2012) (citing
Price v. Fox Entm’t Group, Inc., 473 Supp. 2d 446, 458–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
122
Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1320 (citing Prather, 446 F.2d at 340).
123
Id.
124
Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001).
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statute of limitations has run.”125 Factoring in the basis for the
Fourth Circuit’s bar, the Eleventh Circuit answers “a presumptive
‘no’” to the availability of laches in copyright claims.126
While there is a strong presumption against the availability of
laches in the Eleventh Circuit, the doctrine will be recognized as a
defense in a copyright claim, but “only in the most extraordinary
circumstances” of uncertainty.127 In assessing the factors affecting
the delay elements of laches, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged
that an owner “cannot be fully cognizant of all infringements that
occur throughout the length and breadth of this country.”128 This
proposition, introduced in a patent case, but also applicable in
copyright claims, stated that defenses against infringement claims
“present mixed questions of fact and law concerning which there is
necessarily some doubt and uncertainty.” 129 “Even where such
extraordinary circumstances exist . . . laches serves as a bar only to
the recovery of retrospective damages, not to prospective relief.”130
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that “permitting laches to operate as
a bar on post-filing damages or injunctive relief would encourage
copyright owners to initiate much needless litigation in order to
prevent others from obtaining effective immunity from suits with
respect to future infringements.”131 The Eleventh Circuit allows
laches in “the most extraordinary of circumstances” and in those
circumstances, laches bars only past damages, not prospective
relief.132
3. The Tenth Circuit: Laches Available in Rare Cases
The Tenth Circuit holds that courts should generally defer to
the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations, restricting
125

Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1320.
Id.
127
Id. (The Letterese opinion cited to the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Jacobsen (see
discussion infra Part I.D.3) and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Chirco (see discussion
infra Part I.D.4.) to offer additional examples of “extraordinary circumstances.”).
128
Id. at 1321 (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020,
1040–41 (Fed.Cir.1992)).
129
Id. at 1321.
130
Id. at 1321 (citing A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1040–41).
131
Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1321–22.
132
See id. at 1320.
126
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laches defenses to “rare cases.”133 In Jacobsen v. Deseret Book
Co., Dr. Gene S. Jacobsen, a prisoner of war in the Philippines and
Japan during World War II, wrote his personal memoir, entitled
Who Refused to Die.134 Deseret Book Company published a book
written by Dr. Dean Hughes entitled Children of the Promise, a
fictional work written primarily for an audience comprised of
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 135
Children of the Promise portrayed a Latter-day Saint family’s life
during World War II and, in the book, the narrative of one of the
family’s sons, closely resembled Dr. Jacobsen’s experience, as
related in Who Refused to Die. 136 In granting Dr. Hughes’
summary judgment motion on the grounds that laches barred Dr.
Jacobsen’s claims, the district court found “Jacobsen had
knowledge of the material used by Hughes as early as 1994, and no
later than 1996,” and “had ample opportunity to let Hughes know
of his disapproval as early as 1996.”137 His delay in bringing a
claim until 1999 caused “extreme prejudice to Hughes.”138 The
Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on the laches defense.139
In determining the availability of laches in Jacobsen, the Tenth
Circuit looked to United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, which held,
“it has been observed that in deference to the doctrine of the
separation of powers, the Supreme Court has been circumspect in
adopting principles of equity in the context of enforcing federal
statutes.” 140 Rodriguez-Aguirre, who had been convicted of
money laundering, drug, and other offenses, sought the return of
personal property that was seized by the federal government. 141
The Tenth Circuit held that “motions for return of seized property
are governed by six-year statute of limitations, which generally
133

Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 950–51 (10th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 940.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 949.
139
Id. at 955.
140
Id. at 950–51 (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195, 1207–08
(10th Cir. 2001)).
141
Id.
134
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may not be shortened by laches” and that “laches was in any event
inapplicable, as the government did not show that it suffered
material prejudice due to delay.”142 “[W]hen a limitation on the
period for bringing suit has been set by statute, laches will
generally not be invoked to shorten the statutory period,” although
“it is possible, in rare cases, that a statute of limitations can be cut
short by the doctrine of laches.”143 Rodriguez-Aguirre established
the availability of laches in “rare” cases and Jacobsen applied this
standard to copyrights.
The Tenth Circuit also opened the door for laches by
delineating why the statute of limitations suffices in Jacobsen.
The defendant invoked Jackson v. Axton to support the availability
of laches. 144 The Tenth Circuit distinguished Jacobsen from
Jackson.145 In doing so, the court established the possibility of a
laches defense arising from distinguishable facts in another case.146
If laches were completely unavailable, an examination of the facts
of the delay elements in Jackson and in Jacobsen would have been
irrelevant.
4. The Sixth Circuit: Laches Available in the Most
Compelling of Cases
The Sixth Circuit allows laches in “the most compelling of
cases.”147 In Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities, Inc., Detroit-area
real estate developers Michael Chirco and Dominic Moceri
brought a copyright infringement suit against Crosswinds
Communities and its principal shareholder, Bernard Glieberman,
alleging that the defendants copied the plaintiffs’ architectural
design for a “twelve-plex” condominium building. 148 The
plaintiffs obtained copyrights on November 28, 1997 for the
architectural plans.149 On December 31, 2000, Glieberman began
building the Heritage Condominium development in Waterford
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Id.
Id.
See id. (citing Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1994)).
See id.
See id.
Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
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Township, Michigan, allegedly according to plans based directly
upon or copied from the copyrighted plans.150 On April 1, 2001,
the plaintiffs filed suit against Glieberman in federal district court,
alleging copyright infringement and seeking injunctive and
monetary relief. During that suit’s discovery period, 151 the
plaintiffs learned of Glieberman’s plans to build Jonathan’s
Landing, another development, from those copyrighted designs.152
On October 16, 2001, plaintiffs made a request for the Jonathan’s
Landing plans and received them a week later.153 Plaintiffs took
no action—even after development began for the 252-unit building
in May of 2002—until November 14, 2003, when they filed a
second federal law suit against Glieberman.154 By that time, 168
of the planned 252 units had been constructed, 141 of them sold,
and 109 were already occupied by the buyers.155 The district court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that
laches barred the plaintiffs’ infringement claims.156 The Court of
Appeals “reemphasize[d]” the availability of laches in the Sixth
Circuit. 157 The plaintiffs’ failure to initiate “readily-available
actions to abate the alleged harm” and the undue prejudice this
inaction caused to the defendants and innocent third parties led the
court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ efforts to mandate the destruction of
the Jonathan’s Landing project.158
The court in Chirco cited to the Fourth Circuit’s standard to
establish a separate of powers concerns over the application of
laches.159 “[W]hen considering the timeliness of a cause of action
brought pursuant to a statute for which Congress has provided a
limitations period, a court should not apply laches to overrule the
legislature’s judgment as to the appropriate time limit to apply for
actions brought under the statute.”160 In connection with copyright
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Id.
Id. (referring to the Chirco v. Charter Oak Homes, Inc. (No. 01-71403) lawsuit.).
Chirco, 474 F.3d at 230.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 236.
Id.
See Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2001).
Chirco, 474 F.3d at 232 (citing Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 798).
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claims, separation of powers principles place the application of
timeliness rule adopted by courts in deference to the legislatively
prescribed statute of limitations.161
The Sixth Circuit sought further support in assessing the
appropriate level of deference to the statute of limitations.162 The
Tenth Circuit ruled that “[r]ather than deciding cases on the issue
of laches, courts should generally defer to the three-year statute of
limitations, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), provided by the Copyright Act.”163
In rare cases, the Tenth Circuit did acknowledge that “a court can
apply laches in a copyright case.”164 The Sixth Circuit adopted the
Tenth Circuit’s presumptive deference to the statute of limitations,
while allowing laches in outlying cases.165
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit introduced the Ninth
Circuit’s application of laches to assess availability in these
outlying cases.166 Jackson v. Axton,167 Kling v. Hallmark Cards,
Inc., 168 and Danjaq L.L.C. 169 comprise the Ninth Circuit’s
presumption in favor of the availability of laches. The court’s
inclusion of the Ninth Circuit’s standards evidenced the Sixth
Circuit’s willingness to apply laches in certain circumstances,
situating its approach between the Ninth Circuit and the Fourth
Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit identified the “middle ground” on which it
stands, between the Fourth Circuit’s strict bar on laches in cases
with an explicit limitations provision and the more lenient
application of the doctrine by the Ninth Circuit.170 In Tandy Corp.
v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 171 the Sixth Circuit explained its nearexclusive preference for the statute of limitations:
161

See Chirco, 474 F.3d at 231–32.
See generally Chirco, 474 F.3d 227.
163
Id. at 232 (citing Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 950 (10th Cir.
2002)).
164
See Chirco, 474 F.3d at 232 (citing Jacobsen, 287 F.3d at 951).
165
See generally Chirco, 474 F.3d 227.
166
Id. at 232.
167
25 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1994).
168
225 F.3d 1030, 1036–42 (9th Cir. 2000).
169
263 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 2001).
170
Chirco, 474 F.3d 227, 232 (6th Cir 2007).
171
769 F.2d 362 (6th Cir.1985).
162
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It enhances the stability and clarity of the law by
applying neutral rules and principles in an
evenhanded fashion rather than making the question
purely discretionary . . . requires courts to make
clear distinctions between threshold or special
defenses or pleas in bar and the merits of the
case . . . [and] enhances the rationality and
objectivity of the process by preventing courts from
short circuiting difficult issues on the merits by
confusing or conflating the merits of an action with
other defenses.172
The court strongly restricted laches when an applicable statute
referenced an explicit limitations period, but this was not an
absolute bar. In Hoste v. Radio Corp. of America, 173 the Sixth
Circuit reversed a district court ruling that barred recovery for the
plaintiff by application of laches within the statute of limitations
period, but it did so without ruling that the laches doctrine was
always inapplicable in such a situation. 174 In Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 175 the court noted, “[a]lthough
circuits are split as to whether laches is available as a defense
under the Copyright Act, laches is available as an affirmative
defense in a copyright action in the Sixth Circuit.”176 Although the
Sixth Circuit sought to restrict the availability of laches to the most
compelling copyright infringement cases, it explicitly recognizes
that the defense is available.177
The Sixth Circuit concluded that it allows laches in “what can
best be described as unusual circumstances.” 178 Claims brought
within the limitations period provided by the Copyright Act will be
allowed to proceed.179 However, “when the relief sought will work
an unjust hardship upon the defendants or upon innocent third
parties,” the courts “must ensure that judgments never envisioned
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

Id. at 365.
654 F.2d 11 (6th Cir.1981).
Id. at 12; see also Chirco, 474 F.3d at 233.
396 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 783–84; see also Chirco, 474 F.3d at 233.
Broadcast Music, Inc., 396 F.3d at 783–84.
Chirco, 474 F.3d at 234.
Id. at 236.
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by the legislative drafters are not allowed to stand.”180 When relief
will cause “unjust hardship,”181 the Sixth Circuit allows laches.
5. The Second Circuit: Laches Bars only Injunctive Relief
In the Second Circuit, laches bars injunctive remedies, but not
legal remedies in copyright claims brought within the statute of
limitations. In New Era Publications International, ApS v. Henry
Holt & Co., Inc., a fair use copyright case over the inclusion of
various published and unpublished writings of L. Ron Hubbard in
a biography, laches barred the plaintiff’s injunctive relief.182 The
biography, written by Russell Miller, is entitled Bare-Faced
Messiah: The True Story of L. Ron Hubbard. 183 New Era
Publications International, ApS (“New Era”) held by license
certain copyrights bequeathed to the Church of Scientology by
Hubbard, upon his death in 1986.184 Henry Holt and Company,
Inc. (“Henry Holt”) published Bare-Faced Messiah.185 New Era
claimed the reproduction of Hubbard’s published and unpublished
writings in Bare-Faced Messiah infringed on its copyrights.186
Henry Holt asserted that New Era’s inaction barred its claims.
The Second Circuit stated “equitable considerations [that] dictate
denial of injunctive relief in this action” framed the possibilities of
recovery for the infringement.187 New Era’s inaction occurred in
spite of its knowledge of the book’s publication in the United
States, and its knowledge of lawsuits commenced in 1987 to enjoin
publication in England, Canada and Australia.188 New Era “failed
to compare Holt’s book with the books published abroad; failed to
inquire of Holt as to the planned date of publication in this country;
and failed to take any steps to enjoin publication of the book until
it sought a restraining order in May of 1988.”189 At the time New
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id.
Id. at 236.
873 F.2d 576, 577 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 584.
Id.
Id.
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Era requested an injunction, “12,000 copies of the book already
had been printed, packed and (except for 3,000 copies left on a
loading dock) shipped.” 190 The district court declined an
injunction and limited the plaintiff to damages. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, concluding laches barred an injunctive relief.191
In invoking laches, Holt pointed to New Era’s unreasonable
delay in bringing the action and the resulting expectations-based
prejudice it caused the defendant.192 New Era’s delay prevented
the alteration of the book at a minimal cost in a timely manner.193
If New Era had promptly sought an adjudication of its rights, the
book might have been changed at minimal cost while there still
was an opportunity to do so. 194 Given the delay, a permanent
injunction would amount to the “total destruction of the work,”
since it would not have been economically feasible to reprint the
book after deletion of the infringing material.195 New Era’s delay
and the prejudice resulting from that delay constituted laches and
compelled the denial of the injunction and constraint of New Era to
recovering damages.196
The Second Circuit limits laches to bar a claim filed within the
statute of limitations to rare occasions.197 When the laches defense
is available, it can bar only equitable relief, not legal relief. “The
prevailing rule [in the Second Circuit is] that when a plaintiff
brings a federal statutory claim seeking legal relief, laches cannot
bar that claim, at least where the statute contains an express
limitations period within which the action is timely.” 198 The
Second Circuit found that the judge in the district court did not
abuse his discretion in declining an injunction against the
publication of Bare-Faced Messiah, while “leaving New Era a
190

Id. at 584.
Id. at 577.
192
Id. at 584 (citing Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804 (8th
Cir. 1979)).
193
New Era Publ’ns Int’l, 873 F.2d at 577 (citing New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry
Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1528 (S.D.N.Y.1988)).
194
New Era Publ’ns Int’l, 873 F.2d at 577
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Ikelionwu v. United States, 150 F.3d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1998).
198
Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1997).
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damages claim as to the very little, insignificant material unfairly
used.” 199 In Second Circuit copyright claims, laches can bar
injunctive relief, while allowing a plaintiff to pursue a claim
seeking damages.
6. The Ninth Circuit: A Presumption in Favor of Laches
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a presumption in favor of laches
for copyright claims brought within the statute of limitations.
Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp. followed in a lineage of Ninth Circuit
cases200 in holding that laches may bar a statutorily timely claim,
when appropriate. 201
Danjaq L.L.C. and other entities
(collectively, “Danjaq”) involved in the production and distribution
of the James Bond films maintained that Ian Fleming created the
James Bond character and that Fleming, along with producers
Harry Saltzman and Albert “Cubby” Broccoli assigned the rights
to them.202 Kevin O’Donovan McClory and Spectre Associates,
Inc. (“McClory”) contended that McClory transformed Fleming’s
cantankerous and unlikeable character into the now widelyrecognized debonair Bond and that they have a “significant stake”
in the Bond franchise stemming from work on the Thunderball
screenplay.203
McClory’s period of delay in Danjaq satisfied the delay
element in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere.204 McClory’s alleged
delay in this case spanned from the time of the Bond films’ initial
release.205 From 1962’s Dr. No and 1977’s The Spy Who Loved
Me, through his filing of a counterclaim in this suit in 1998,
McClory took no legal action regarding the alleged
infringements.206 According to McClory’s calculations, “various
199

New Era Publ’ns Int’l, 873 F.2d at 597–98.
See, e.g., Kling v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2000);
Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1994).
201
Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 954 (9th Cir. 2001).
202
Id. at 947.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 952; see also New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 585
(2d Cir. 1989) (holding that two year delay, combined with “severe prejudice,” supports
laches); Jackson, 25 F.3d at 889 (holding that a delay of at least nineteen years is
sufficient).
205
Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 947.
206
Id. at 952–53.
200
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actions on his part should stop the clock on laches.” 207 He
identified his 1961 lawsuit against Fleming as one such action, but
the court excluded the effect of this suit, as it was not against
Danjaq. 208 McClory also sought to “stop the clock” in a 1976
claim by McClory and Sean Connery that The Spy Who Loved Me
infringed upon their script for James Bond of the Secret Service, an
action in which they sought to enjoin Danjaq from infringing upon
McClory’s rights in Thunderball. The court held that litigation,
brought and dismissed in 1976, stopped the clock on laches “only
momentarily” and the twenty-two years since amounted to
unreasonable delay.209 The district court concluded that McClory
had knowledge of the alleged infringement since at least 1961 and
that his only action to enforce any rights against Danjaq was the
1976 litigation involving a claim unrelated to the case before them.
The delay of either 21 or 36 years between McClory’s knowledge
of the potential claims and the initiation of present litigation
resulted in “overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence of
substantial prejudice.” 210 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s conclusion that Danjaq provided sufficient evidence
of laches and that laches barred all of McClory’s claims.211
Laches can bar all relief in the Ninth Circuit.212 The potential
adversity this poses for plaintiffs is well-recognized. Judge
Fletcher, in the concurring opinion to Petrella v. Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc., stated “[o]ur circuit is the most hostile to copyright
owners of all the circuits.” 213 Courts have observed the Ninth
Circuit’s hostility to copyright owners as benefiting parties
exploiting underlying works, such as motion picture studios: “[f]or
better or worse, we are the Court of Appeals for the Hollywood
Circuit.” 214 As noted in the Senate Report accompanying the
Copyright Act’s statute of limitations, prior to the 1957, California
207

Id. at 953.
Id.
209
Id.
210
Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 950.
211
Id. at 963.
212
Id.
213
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013).
214
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F. 2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 2000).
208
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adopted a short statute of limitations in copyright claims to protect
its movie industry.215 If the defendant in an infringement claim is
not a “deliberate pirate” 216 or a “willful infringer,” 217 the Ninth
Circuit presumes the availability of laches to bar both legal and
equitable remedies.
The Ninth Circuit recognized that prejudice to a defendant
caused by a plaintiff’s delay is typically sufficiently distanced from
a defendant’s continuing behavior that “threatens future harm.”218
Laches rarely affects prospective injunctive relief, given the
separation in temporal concerns each doctrine addresses.219 The
court in Danjaq cited to the Fourth Circuit to address this concept:
“a prospective injunction is entered only on the basis of current,
ongoing conduct that threatens future harm. Inherently, such
conduct cannot be so remote in time as to justify the application of
the doctrine of laches.” 220 On appeal in Danjaq, McClory
challenged the district court’s holding that laches barred “all of
counterclaimants’ claims based on the rights at issue.”221 McClory
argued that even if laches applies, it does not bar a prospective
injunction against future infringement.222 The court affirmed the
general propriety of this principle, but stated the rule is not
absolute and, in the present case, “the feared future infringements
are subject to the same prejudice that bars retrospective relief.”223
McClory sought to establish an “original sin”: Richard Maibaum’s
alleged access to the Thunderball script materials from which each
215

S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1962; see
also Brief for Petitioner at 14, Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 50
(2013) (No. 12-1315) 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2155.
216
Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. Int’l, 533 F.3d
1287, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 232 (6th
Cir. 2007); Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 951.
217
Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 956–59.
218
Id.
219
See also 3 NIMMER, supra note 121, § 12.06 (“[E]ven if laches constitutes a bar to an
action for past infringements of the same work, if the plaintiff acted without undue delay
with respect to the particular infringement in issue, the defense of laches may not be
raised as to such infringement.” (citing Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 960; Hampton v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.1960))).
220
Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 799 (4th Cir. 2001).
221
Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 959.
222
Id.
223
Id.
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infringement, James Bond movies past, present, and future,
stemmed.224 “In a situation like this one,” the court held, “laches
may bar prospective injunctive relief,” as “we already know that
prospective claims will suffer from the very same evidentiary
defects that bar older claims.”225 The court limited this holding to
instances where “a special case that arises only when we know in
advance that the defendant will be substantially prejudiced in its
ability to defend future claimed infringements in just the same way
that it was prejudiced with regard to prior alleged
infringements.”226 Danjaq served to define a class of cases where
laches could bar prospective injunctive relief.
Petrella involves the application of laches to bar an
infringement claim brought within the Copyright Act’s statute of
limitations.227 Boxer Jake LaMotta (“LaMotta”) and writer Frank
Peter Petrella (“F. Petrella”) collaborated on a book, Raging Bull
(“the book”), and two screenplays (the “1963 screenplay” and the
“1973 screenplay”) about LaMotta’s life and career, which
allegedly became the basis for the movie Raging Bull (“the film”)
released in 1980.228 In 1976, F. Petrella and LaMotta assigned all
of their respective copyright rights in the book and “in and to those
certain screenplays based on [the book] which were written in
1963 and 1973” to Chartoff-Winkler Productions, Inc.,
“exclusively and forever, including all periods of copyright and
renewals and extensions thereof.” 229 In 1978, United Artists
Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc., acquired the motion picture rights to Raging Bull
pursuant to a written assignment from Chartoff-Winkler
Productions, Inc. 230 United Artists registered a copyright in the
film in 1980.231 In 1981, during the original 28-year term of the
copyrights for the book and the two screenplays, F. Petrella died,
224

Id.
Id. at 960.
226
Id.
227
See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013).
228
Id. at 949.
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Id. at 950.
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and his renewal rights in the works passed to his heirs.232 In 1990,
F. Petrella’s daughter, Paula Petrella, learned of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Stewart v. Abend233 and engaged an attorney to
advise and assist her regarding her renewal rights.234 She alleged
she is the sole owner of the F. Petrella interest in the book and the
two screenplays.235 The attorney filed a renewal application for
the 1963 screenplay on her behalf in 1991. 236 Following
intermittent correspondence with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer in the
interceding years, Petrella initiated her claim in 2009.237
The district court noted that Petrella’s lawsuit presents “an
interesting variation on the problems that might arise from the fact
that a derivative work cannot be exploited after the expiration of
the original copyright term in the underlying work without the
consent of the copyright owner in the renewal term.” 238 The
district court held that defendants established each element of
laches and granted their motion for summary judgment.239
The Ninth Circuit in Petrella cited to Miller v. Glenn Miller
Prods., Inc.240 and Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc.,241
both trademark cases, to establish a presumption of laches. “If a
plaintiff files suit within the applicable period of limitations for his
claim, there is a strong presumption that laches does not bar the
claims. Conversely, if any part of the alleged wrongful conduct
occurred outside of the limitations period, courts presume that the

232

Id.
495 U.S. 207 (1990). In Stewart v. Abend, the Court held that “when an author dies
before a renewal period arrives, his statutory successors are entitled to renewal rights,
even though the author has previously assigned the renewal rights to another party,” id. at
219, and “[t]he owner of a derivative work does not retain [the] right to exploit that work
when the death of the author causes the renewal rights in the preexisting work to revert to
the statutory successors.” Id. at 207.
234
Petrella, 695 F.3d at 950.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. CV 09-72 (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
2010) at 83.
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Id. at 83–84.
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454 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2006).
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304 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002).
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plaintiff’s claims are barred by laches.” 242 The Lanham Act, the
federal trademark statute, contains no statute of limitations for
infringement claims.243 The Ninth Circuit relied on the holdings in
trademark cases as authorities to support the availability of laches
in a copyright case.
The court in Petrella determined that the plaintiff’s various
considerations influencing her inaction were unreasonable. The
court assessed the delay element of laches as “the period from
when the plaintiff knew—or should have known—of the allegedly
infringing conduct, until the initiation of the lawsuit in which the
defendant seeks to counterpose the laches defense.”244 The district
court found that it was “undisputed plaintiff was aware of her
potential claims (as was MGM) since 1991,” when her attorney
filed her renewal application for the 1963 screenplay.245 Petrella
did not file her lawsuit until 18 years later, in January 2009.246
Petrella testified that she did not contact the defendants to make
them aware of any claims during this eighteen-year period because
“the film was deeply in debt and in the red and would probably
never recoup” and she “did not know there was a time limit to
making such claims.”247 In the Ninth Circuit, delay in bringing a
claim “to determine whether the scope of proposed infringement
will justify the cost of litigation” may be reasonable. 248 However,
the court considers “delay for the purpose of capitalizing “on the
value of the alleged infringer’s labor, by determining whether the
infringing conduct will be profitable” unreasonable.249 The Court
of Appeals found that the district court did not err in finding

242

Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 997 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Jarrow
Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 835–37 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
243
Pub. L. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, enacted July 6, 1946 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et
seq. (2012)).
244
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013).
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Id.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 954 (9th Cir. 2001).
249
Id. (citing Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)).
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Petrella’s delays in notification and in filing suit—nineteen years,
combined—were unreasonable.250
Petrella’s delay resulted in evidentiary prejudice that affects a
key factual discrepancy in this claim.
The evaluation of
evidentiary prejudice in the district court stated that the 1963
screenplay’s designation of F. Petrella as writing “in collaboration”
with LaMotta is “not inconsistent” with Petrella’s claim of sole
authorship, unless it can be shown that LaMotta made “some [de
minimis] creative contribution to the screenplay.”251 In analyzing
the effect Petrella’s delay had on resolving these factual disputes,
the district court noted, “LaMotta is 88-years-old (now 92-yearsold) and has suffered myriad blows to his head as a fighter years
ago,” severely limiting his capabilities as a reliable witness. 252
Petrella’s delay of over twenty years diminished the effectiveness
of a witness central to the determination of material facts in her
claim.
Defendants in Petrella submitted extensive evidence of
expectations-based prejudice to support a laches defense. Edward
J. Slizewski, Senior Vice President for Participations & Residuals
for Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., testified that since 1991,
when Petrella knew of alleged infringement, the defendants
“distributed the Film on a continuous basis in the United States and
abroad, and . . . expended substantial financial and other resources
as a part of this effort,” including “costs relating to marketing,
advertising, distributing and otherwise promoting the Film in
various media.” 253 Slizewski calculated that these costs totaled
nearly $8.5 million in the United States alone.254 “These activities
and expenditures were made based on the understanding and belief
that the [defendants] have complete ownership and control of the
Film.” 255 Petrella’s hypothetical timely action—filing suit in
1991—would have given defendants an opportunity to litigate this
250

Petrella, 695 F.3d at 952.
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. CV 09-72 (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
2010) at 84.
252
Id. at 104–05.
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Id. at 64.
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Petrella, 695 F.3d at 953–54.
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claim before making these significant investments in the Film.256
Petrella’s delay deprived the defendants of this opportunity. 257
Slizewski stated that the defendants had, since 1991, entered into
numerous agreements to license the Film, including various
agreements authorizing television networks to broadcast Raging
Bull through 2015.258 Petrella argued that the defendants earned a
substantial profit as a result of the delay and would not have done
anything different, or been in any better position, had she filed suit
sooner.259 In Jackson, an ownership dispute over the song “Joy to
the World,” the court found prejudice after a delay of eighteen to
twenty-two years sufficient to support a laches defense, despite the
defendant’s profit from the delay, and without any assertion that he
would have acted differently had the suit been filed sooner. 260
During those 18 to 22 years, the defendant had “arranged his
business affairs around the song, promoted the song as his own,
licensed the song many times to third parties, and sold the song . . .
numerous business transactions had been made in reliance on the
defendant’s sole ownership of the song.”261 Petrella’s assertions
that the defendants prospered her delay and that the defendants
would not have conducted their business surrounding the licensing,
distribution, and re-releases of Raging Bull any differently if she
had initiated litigation in 1991 are irrelevant. Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc. based its actions in part on Petrella’s failure to assert
her rights in the Film and these actions amounted to expectationsbased prejudice.
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS CONFLICTS OVER THE AVAILABILITY
OF LACHES IN THE PRESENCE OF A CONGRESSIONALLY CREATED
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The primary conflict across the circuits over the availability of
laches stems from separation of powers concerns. These concerns
256
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Id.
258
Id.
259
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260
25 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,
510 U.S. 517 (1994).
261
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257
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arise over the availability of the judicially created262 doctrine for
claims brought within the congressionally codified statute of
limitations.263 The Supreme Court, in certain cases, limits the role
of the judiciary in prescribing actions in tension with
congressionally created statutes or explicit statutes of limitations
provisions. More recently, the Supreme Court has allowed
equitable doctrines, including laches, in cases with explicit filing
requirements.
In determining the availability of equitable
doctrines in federal statutory claims, the Supreme Court weighs the
remedial purpose of the statute against the particular purpose of the
filing requirement. The application of laches in the various circuits
corresponds to the weight the circuits accord to these factors.
The circuit split over the availability of laches is a split over
applying the equitable doctrine to claims involving discrete acts of
infringement and those arising from continuing acts of
infringement. The Fourth Circuit’s definitive bar on laches and the
Eleventh, Tenth, Sixth, and Second Circuit’s relegation of laches to
rare cases generally applies to discrete acts of infringement. The
Ninth Circuit’s presumption in favor of laches occurs in frequently
addressing continuing acts of infringement. Additionally, an
inconsistency appears in the remedies laches bars across the
circuits. The central conflict exists over the Ninth Circuit’s
presumed availability of laches in claims arising from continuing
acts of infringement and the remaining circuits deference to the
federal statute of limitations for claims involving discrete acts of
infringement. This inconsistency across the circuits perpetuates
the unpredictability the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations
aimed to eliminate.

262

Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013).
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A. Supreme Court Reasoning on the Availability of Judicially
Created Doctrines in Cases with Controlling Federal Statutes
1. Beyond the Province and Duty of the Judiciary: Against the
Availability of Equitable Doctrines
A line of reasoning in Supreme Court decisions maintains that
equitable defenses, including laches, should not be available in
federal statutory claims with express statutory provisions. The
Supreme Court delineated one approach in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill. 264 In navigating the “irreconcilable conflict
between operation of the Tellico Dam and the explicit provisions
of § 7 of the Endangered Species Act,” the Court acknowledged
that under the ruling of Hecht Co. v. Bowles,265 a federal judge “is
not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every
violation of law.” 266 However, the Court asserted that the
“individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular
course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in
the process of interpreting a statute.”267 The role of the judiciary is
to discern the “meaning of an enactment” and decide if the statute
comports with the Constitution.268 Once these determinations are
made, “the judicial process comes to an end.”269 Tennessee Valley
Authority circumscribed the “province and duty of the judicial
department” to interpreting meaning and assessing a statute’s
constitutionality.270
The Supreme Court specifically dealt with the availability of
laches in a federal statutory claim in the presence of an explicit
statute of limitations in Holmberg. 271 The suit was brought on
behalf of creditors of the Southern Minnesota Joint Stock Land
Bank of Minneapolis to enforce the liability imposed upon
shareholders of the Bank by § 16 of the Federal Farm Loan Act

264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271

437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978).
321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 193.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
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after the bank closed in May 1932. 272 Petitioners did not learn
until 1942 that Jules S. Bache hid his ownership stake in the bank
under the name Charles Armbrecht and thus they did not bring an
action until November 1943.273 Respondents’ first defense stated
that under New York Civil Practice Act § 53, the statute of
limitations barred such an action after ten years.274 Respondents’
second defense claimed laches based on undue delay in the
commencement of the action.275 The district court ruled against
the respondents.276 The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that
the New York statute of limitations was controlling and that the
mere lapse of ten years barred the action.277 As this predominance
of the statute of limitations over equitable doctrines is of
“considerable importance in enforcing liability under federal
equitable enactments,” the Supreme Court reviewed the holding.278
The Supreme Court held, “[i]f Congress explicitly puts a limit
upon the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is an end
of the matter.”279 Adhering to the “definitive” nature of the statute
of limitations, the Supreme Court ruled against the availability of a
laches defense. 280 Notable for the purposes of exploring the
current availability of laches in claims brought under the Copyright
Act, the statute of limitations in Holmberg was state, not federal.
2. “When Equity So Requires”: In Favor of the Availability of
Equitable Doctrines
The presence of a statute of limitations in federal statutory
claims has not precluded the Supreme Court from considering the
applicability of laches. In National Railroad Passenger Corp., the
Court held that while an actionable offense must occur within the
statutory time period, the “application of equitable doctrines . . .
may either limit or toll the time period” when a petitioner may file
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
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a claim.281 In National Railroad Passenger Corp., Abner Morgan,
Jr. sued National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 282 alleging discrete
discriminatory and retaliatory acts and the presence of a racially
hostile work environment throughout his employment. 283 Under
Title VII, 284 a plaintiff must file a claim with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) either 180 or 300
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.
The Court considered “whether, and under what circumstances” a
plaintiff may bring charges on a practice occurring “outside this
statutory time period,” establishing that absolute adherence to the
statute of limitations proved unnecessary.285
In addressing hostile work environment claims, the Court
included “behavior alleged outside the statutory time period” to
assess a claim, “so long as an act contributing to that hostile
environment takes place within the statutory time period.” 286
Equitable doctrines, including laches, may limit or extend the time
period within which a plaintiff may bring a claim.287 The question
of when an unlawful employment practice has occurred
predominated in this case for both discrete discriminatory acts and
hostile work environment claims. 288 The Court distinguished
between “[d]iscrete acts such as termination, failure to promote,
denial of transfer, or refusal to hire,” which “are easy to identify,”
and “hostile environment claims,” the very nature of which
“involves repeated conduct.”289
For discrete acts, “[c]ourts may evaluate whether it would be
proper to apply such doctrines, although they are to be applied
sparingly.” 290 The court bases the application of equitable
281

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
283
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 104.
284
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) (2009).
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Id.
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doctrines on the facts of the case, as “[p]rocedural requirements
established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are
not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for
particular litigants.”291 Courts make fact-based determinations as
to the application of equitable doctrines in cases involving discrete
acts, with the general presumption favoring adherence to the
statute of limitations.
The unlawful employment practices involved in hostile work
environment claims can span years and a single offensive act
within a pattern of hostility may not rise to the level of an
actionable offense.292 The Court allows a plaintiff to base a suit on
individual acts that occurred outside the statute of limitations, if
those acts support the single unlawful employment practice of a
hostile work environment. 293 “The statute does not separate
individual acts that are part of the hostile environment claim from
the whole for the purposes of timely filing and liability.” 294 In
cases arising from repeated conduct, courts are not as strictly
bound to the period delineated by the statute of limitations as in
cases involving discrete acts, but rather may allow equitable
doctrines, including laches, to evaluate conduct over an extended
span of time.
The Court concluded that though the statutory filing period
applies more strictly to plaintiffs raising claims of discrete
discriminatory or retaliatory acts than to those alleging a hostile
work environment, in neither case are courts precluded from
applying equitable doctrines that affect the time period in which a
plaintiff may bring a claim.295 The statutory filing period is not a
strict prerequisite in bringing a federal claim, but rather, it is a
requirement subject to waiver, estoppel, equitable tolling, and
laches, “when equity so requires.” 296 In National Railroad
Passenger Corp., these equitable doctrines, including laches,
promoted the remedial purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
291
292
293
294
295
296

Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984).
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 115.
Id. at 117–18.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 121 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982)).
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of 1964, “without negating the particular purpose of the filing
requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.” 297 The
stricter application of the statutory filing period for discrete
discriminatory acts and higher availability of equitable doctrines in
hostile work environment claims involving repeated conduct
translates into the Copyright law.
B. The Availability of Laches in Copyright Infringement Cases
Before Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
1. Weighing the Remedial Purpose of the Copyright Act
Against the Particular Purpose of the Statute of Limitations
The Supreme Court addressed the availability of equitable
doctrines, including laches, in claims filed within Title VII’s
statute of limitations in National Railroad Passenger Corp. If
applying an equitable doctrine promotes the remedial purpose of
the statute “without negating the particular purpose of the filing
requirement,” the Court deems the use acceptable.298 The remedial
purpose of the Copyright Act allows “[t]he legal or beneficial
owner of an exclusive right under a copyright . . . to institute an
action for any infringement of that particular right committed
while he or she is the owner of it.”299 The Copyright Act outlines
specific remedies in § 502 to § 505, including “injunctions,”
“impounding and disposition of infringing articles,” “damages and
profits,” and “costs and attorney’s fees.”300 Congress determined it
“highly desirable to provide a uniform (limitations) period
throughout the United States” that would deter forum shopping in
copyright claims and enacted a statute of limitations in 1957.301
The disagreement across the circuits of the availability of laches
negates the “particular purpose” of the filing requirement, as it
encourages forum shopping.302 The availability of laches in certain
circuits and not others in comparable cases undermines the aim of

297
298
299
300
301
302

Id.
Id. (in Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., it was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012).
17 U.S.C. §§ 502–05 (2012).
S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1962.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 121.
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the statute of limitations to create a national uniformity, as regional
differences remain.
Congressional materials accompanying the addition of the
statute of limitations to the Copyright Act illuminate the intent of
the 1957 amendment to the Copyright Act. The Senate Report
addressed the differences in state law for areas with a high number
of copyright cases and those with few.303 Specifically, the Senate
Report addressed the favoritism California showed to the film
industry, a trend continued to this day with the Ninth Circuit’s
presumption in favor of laches.304 Laches allows studios to bar
infringement claims brought by copyright owners whose works
achieved financial success after a significant period of time. 305
One interpretation of National Railroad Passenger Corp. focuses
on the purpose of the statute in deciding the availability of laches.
While several circuits cite separation of powers concerns that
laches works against the particular purpose of the Copyright Act’s
statute of limitations, circumstances arise in copyright cases when
the strict application of the statute of limitations does not result in a
fair outcome.
2. The Differential Treatment of Discrete Acts of
Infringement and Continuing Acts of Infringement
In National Railroad Passenger Corp., the Court stated that
“[t]he statutory filing period is not a strict prerequisite” 306 in
bringing a federal claim, but rather, it is a requirement subject to
waiver, estoppel, equitable tolling, and laches, “when equity so
requires.” 307 In considering appropriate standards for applying
equitable doctrines, the Court distinguished between “[d]iscrete
acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or
refusal to hire” which “are easy to identify” and “hostile
environment claims” the very nature of which “involves repeated
conduct.” 308 A second interpretation of National Railroad
303

S. REP NO. 85-1014, at 2.
Id.
305
Id.
306
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 103 (2002) (citing Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982)).
307
Id.
308
Id. at 114–15; see also 1 B. LINDEMANN & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 289, at 348–49.
304
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Passenger Corp. allows for a spectrum of availability based on the
type of conduct, as the Supreme Court differentiates between
discrete acts and repeated conduct in their assessing the application
of equitable doctrines. The Court allows a plaintiff to base a suit
on individual acts that occurred outside the statute of limitations, if
those acts support the single unlawful employment practice of a
hostile work environment.309
In the leading cases across several circuits, the courts address
copyright claims analogous to discrete acts, “easy to identify”
infringements that do not stem from the licensing of underlying
works, and the production, distribution, release, and re-release of
derivative works, often continuing over a period of many years and
involving repeated infringing acts.310 The availability of laches in
copyright claims analogous to discrete acts of discrimination is
subject to varying restrictions across the circuits. The Fourth
Circuit does not allow laches for copyright infringement claims
brought within the statute of limitations 311 in deference to the
“definitive” aims of the federal statute.312 The Eleventh Circuit
recognizes laches “only in the most extraordinary
circumstances”313 and holds a “strong presumption that a plaintiff’s
suit is timely if it is filed before the statute of limitations has
run.”314 These “extraordinary circumstances” 315 include claims in
which an owner “cannot be fully cognizant of all infringements
that occur throughout the length and breadth of this country.”316 In
those claims, “laches serves as a bar only to the recovery of
retrospective damages, not to prospective relief.”317 Similarly, the
309

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 117–18.
Id.; see, e.g., Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters.
Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227
(6th Cir. 2007); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 2002); Lyons
P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001); New Era Publ’ns
Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).
311
Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 796.
312
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
313
Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1320.
314
Id.
315
Id.
316
Id. at 1321; see A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020,
1040–41 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
317
Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1321.
310
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Tenth Circuit reserves laches for “rare cases.”318 The Sixth Circuit
generally reserves the defense for only “the most compelling of
cases.”319 While holding a presumptive deference to the statute of
limitations, outside of the Fourth Circuit’s strict bar, several
circuits do allow laches in “what can best be described as unusual
circumstances.” 320 The inconsistent availability of laches across
the circuits in cases involving discrete infringing acts represents
one significant conflict. This inconsistency diminishes Congress’s
aim of establishing uniformity in copyright cases through the
statute of limitations.
The Ninth Circuit’s leading cases deal with continuing acts of
infringements subject to the “separate accrual rule.”321 Under the
separate accrual rule, the three-year period specified by the statute
of limitations322 accrues separately for each infringing act, even if
the violation is one in a series of continuing acts of
infringement. 323 These claims are analogous to hostile work
environment claims in that they involve repeated conduct,
evaluated in its totality in determining the validity of a claim.324
A conflict exists between the circuits over the remedies laches
bars in copyright claims brought within the statute of limitations.
In the Second Circuit, laches bars injunctive relief, while allowing
a plaintiff to pursue a claim for monetary damages. 325 In the
Eleventh Circuit, “laches serves as a bar only to the recovery of
318

Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 950–51 (10th Cir. 2002).
Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007).
320
Id. at 234.
321
See 3 NIMMER, supra note 121, § 12.05[B][1][b] (“If infringement occurred within
three years prior to filing, the action will not be barred even if prior infringements by the
same party as to the same work are barred because they occurred more than three years
previously.”); Brief for Petitioner at 23, Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 50 (2013) (No. 12-1315) (“No court has required a copyright action seeking relief for
an infringement within the past three years to be brought within three years of the initial
act of infringement.” (citing 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 20:23 (West.
2013))).
322
See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012).
323
See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. CV 09-72 (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Feb.
3, 2010) at 14.
324
See generally Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001); Petrella v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 10-55834 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2012).
325
See New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584–85 (2d Cir.
1989).
319
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retrospective damages, not to prospective relief.”326 Laches in the
Sixth Circuit bars injunctive relief that causes “unjust hardship,”
not necessarily injunctive relief generally, or damages.327 In the
Ninth Circuit, laches can bar claims for damages and injunctive
relief. 328 The discrepancy over the remedies laches bars
exacerbates the forum shopping concerns resulting from the circuit
split over availability.
3. Challenges in Balancing the Role of Equity and the Aims
of the Law in Copyright
While “[t]here is nothing in the copyright statute or its history
to indicate that laches is a proper defense to a suit brought under
the Act,” 329 the role of equity begins where the effectiveness of
statutory provisions ends. The circuits restricting the availability
of laches do so in deference to the law, as codified in the Copyright
Act’s statute of limitations. Laches, a determination made by the
district courts based on the facts in each case, creates an element of
unpredictability in Copyright law. The purpose of updating the
Copyright Act to include the statute of limitations, an amendment
Congress accepted using language identical to the 1957
amendment into the 1976 Copyright Act, 330 was to create a
national uniformity for copyright claims. This uniformity aimed to
avoid the unpredictability and forum shopping created by using
state statute of limitations in copyright cases.
The Ninth Circuit presumes the availability of laches, as it
supports commercial morality in conflicts between copyright
owners and parties exploiting copyrights, who often invest
significant resources into the production and distribution of works.
To achieve equitable results, the Ninth Circuit borrows rules that
function in Trademark law without creating separation of powers
issues and applies them to Copyright law, where their availability
creates a tension with congressionally enacted statutes.
326

Peter Letterese & Assoc., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enter. Int’l, 533 F.3d
1287, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008).
327
See Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 2007).
328
See Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 960 (9th Cir. 2001).
329
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013).
330
See id. (citing to Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 507(b), 90 Stat. 2541, 2586).
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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit selects elements of the continuing
wrongs approach and the rolling statute of limitations and applies
them when advantageous. In so heavily favoring equity, the Ninth
Circuit developed a schism with the other circuits in applying
laches. The conflicts among the circuits over the availability of
laches returned Copyright law to this unpredictability.
III. RESOLVING THE SPLIT OVER THE AVAILABILITY OF LACHES
ACROSS THE CIRCUITS BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TYPES OF
INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
To resolve the circuit split over the availability of laches in
civil copyright claims brought within the Copyright Act’s statute
of limitations, the Supreme Court, in deciding Petrella, should
have distinguished between claims involving discrete infringing
acts and claims arising out of continuing acts of infringement. In
National Railroad Passenger Corp., the Court stated that equitable
doctrines should be more readily available in claims with repeated
discriminatory conduct than those involving discrete acts of
discrimination. Discrete acts of infringement, like discrete acts of
discrimination, should be evaluated with stricter adherence to the
Copyright Act’s statute of limitations, restricting the availability of
equitable doctrines, including laches, to rare cases. The Court
should have held that the availability of laches in Petrella to bar
equitable relief, a case arising from continuing acts of
infringement, should be treated with the same leniency afforded
the availability of equitable doctrines in discrimination claims
involving repeated conduct.
A. Claims Involving Discrete Acts of Infringement
The availability of laches should be restricted in copyright
cases involving discrete acts of infringement. The stricter
adherence to statutory provisions in applying equitable doctrines in
discrimination claims based on discrete acts translates into
copyright. In claims addressing discrete acts of infringement,
laches should only be available in rare circumstances. Rare
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circumstances could involve decades of delay, 331 “extreme
prejudice,” 332 or when injunctive relief would cause “unjust
hardship.” 333 For discrete acts of infringement, the reasonable
standard for the availability of laches falls somewhere between the
Fourth Circuit’s absolute bar 334 and the Ninth Circuit’s
presumptive yes.335 “Rather than deciding cases on the issue of
laches, courts should generally defer to the three-year statute of
limitations, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), provided by the Copyright Act.”336
Beyond this general deference, the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits determine if the laches defense is available based on the
effects of the plaintiffs’ delay in relation to the remedy sought.337
Laches should be available as a bar to equitable remedies, with
claimants free to pursue legal relief, if circumstances permit.338 As
laches is a fact-based case-by-case determination, it is sufficient
framework to suggest that the presumption in favor of the statute
of limitations is a guiding principle and courts are left to decide the
rare exceptions of availability relying on the facts of the infringing
acts and the laches elements.
B. Claims Arising from Continuing Acts of Infringement
Laches should be presumed available in copyright cases arising
from continuing acts of infringement. The leniency in applying
equitable doctrines afforded discrimination claims of repeated
conduct translates into copyright. “[T]he special circumstance of

331

See Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1321; see also discussion supra Part
I.D.2.
332
Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 949 (10th Cir. 2002); see discussion
supra Part I.D.3.
333
Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 2007); see also
discussion supra Part I.D.4.
334
See Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001); see
also discussion supra Part I.D.1.
335
See Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 2001); Kling v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1036–42 (9th Cir. 2000); Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d
884, 888 (9th Cir. 1994); see also discussion supra Part I.D.6.
336
Jacobsen, 287 F.3d at 950; Chirco, 474 F.3d at 232.
337
See Chirco, 474 F.3d. at 227; Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of
Scientology Enters. Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008); Jacobsen, 287 F.3d at 936;
New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).
338
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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re-releases” 339 and analogous repeated conduct, common in the
Ninth Circuit, but relatively rare in other circuits, 340 requires
standards different from discrete acts of copyright infringement.
Laches should be available to allow a defendant to conduct
business without being subject to prejudice as a result of a
plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in bringing a claim. Without this
allowance, the use of copyrighted material, even if properly
licensed at the time of transfer, would cause trepidation for parties
aiming to exploit copyrighted works. As each infringement starts
the statute of limitations running anew and without the availability
of laches, copyright owners could delay initiating claims
indefinitely. Laches should be available as a bar to equitable
remedies, while allowing plaintiffs to pursue legal remedies. The
availability of laches in copyright cases arising from continuing
acts of infringement would likely promote fairness and increase
predictability for parties transacting in copyrighted material.
Without laches, parties seeking declaratory judgments would
abound and cause an undue burden to courts in the Ninth Circuit,
Second Circuit, and beyond.
C. The Supreme Court’s Holding in Petrella v. Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
holding that laches cannot bar a claim for damages, but can
preclude a claim for equitable relief in extraordinary
circumstances. 341 The decision remands the case to the district
court and offers that “a plaintiff’s delay can always be brought to
bear at the remedial stage, in determining appropriate injunctive
relief, and in assessing the ‘profits of the infringer [] attributable to
the infringement.’” 342 To illustrate these extraordinary
circumstances, the Court relies on cases that effectively render
laches largely obsolete. 343 The Petrella decision relegates a
339

Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 954; see discussion supra Part I.C.2.
See S. REP. NO. 85-1014, at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1962;
see also discussion supra Part I.C.2.
341
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, 2014 WL 2011574, at *4
(U.S. May 19, 2014).
342
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012)).
343
Id. at *12.
340
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plaintiff’s extensive delay in bringing suit to one of many factors
taken into account at the district court level.344 Alternately, the
Court tasks the defendant with satisfying the “more exacting” and
“differently oriented” test for estoppel to present an equitable
defense against a copyright claim brought within the statute of
limitations.345
The Court adopts the Second Circuit’s approach, as applied in
New Era Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co.,346
which distinguishes between the availability of laches to bar
equitable relief, but not legal relief. This case contributes to the
definition of “extraordinary” as circumstances that would result in
the “total destruction of the work.” 347 The Court clarifies these
extraordinary circumstances by citing Chirco v. Crosswinds
Communities, Inc., a case which limits the availability of laches to
injunctive relief that would “‘work an unjust hardship’ upon
defendants and third parties.” 348 By defining extraordinary
circumstances exclusively through these two cases, the Court
appears to circumscribe the application of laches to bar injunctive
relief that would manifest physically, an unreasonable standard for
copyright claims.
Assessing laches for claims brought within the statute of
limitations requires determining when the statute of limitations
begins running and from what point a court measures the plaintiff’s
delay. The Court states “[a] copyright claim thus arises or
‘accrue[s]’ when an infringing act occurs.”349 This statement is
incorrect in the vast majority of circuits, including the Ninth
Circuit350 and Second Circuit,351 where the “discovery rule”352 —
344

Id. at *13.
Id. at *11–12.
346
873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).
347
Petrella, 2014 WL 2011574, at *12–13 (citing New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt
& Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584–85 (2d Cir. 1989)).
348
Id. at *12 (citing Chirco v. Crosswinds Comtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir.
2007).
349
Id. at *5.
350
Kling v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2000).
351
Anandashankar Mazumdar, ‘Discovery’ Rule Applies to Copyright Statute of
Limitations in Second Circuit, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.bna.com/
discovery-rule-applies-n17179889472.
352
William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 568 F.3d 425, 433 (3d Cir. 2009).
345
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when a defendant knew or should have known about the alleged
infringing act at issue—applies. 353 The Court departs from
previous methods for measuring the end of a plaintiff’s delay
without offering clarification beyond the assumption that a plaintiff
notifying a defendant of a potential claim suffices. 354 In
minimizing the consequences of Petrella’s delay, the Court states
she “notified MGM of her copyright claims before MGM invested
millions of dollars in creating a new edition of Raging Bull.”355
Previously, a plaintiff needed to file a claim to end delay, and even
then, claims regarding the same work, but against parties the court
considered too attenuated to the present action, did not “stop the
clock” on laches. 356 The Court may favor the injury rule for
infringement accrual or intend to modify the action necessary to
signal the end of a plaintiff’s delay. However, it is possible the
decision marginalizes the application of laches to a point where
these issues will rarely arise.
The Court minimizes the potential harm of allowing a plaintiff
to proceed absent the threat of threshold dismissal for delay, citing
that under the separate accrual rule, the statute of limitations
allows a plaintiff to reach back only three years and “the infringer
is insulated from liability for earlier infringements of the same
work.”357 The Court notes, “when a defendant has engaged (or is
alleged to have engaged) in a series of discrete infringing acts, the
copyright holder’s suit ordinarily will be timely under § 507 (b)
with respect to more recent acts of infringement . . . but untimely
with respect to prior acts of the same or similar kind.” 358 The
Court distinguishes between separately accruing harm and harm
from past violations that are continuing,359 noting that “each new
act must cause ‘harm [to the plaintiff] over and above the harm that
the earlier acts caused,’” 360 while in continuing harm cases, “a
353

Kling, 225 F.3d at 1036.
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, 2014 WL 2011574, at *13
(U.S. May 19, 2014).
355
Id.
356
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 953 (9th Cir. 2001).
357
Petrella, 2014 WL 2011574, at *6.
358
Id.
359
Id. at *6 n.6.
360
Id. (quoting Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., U.S. 179, 190 (U.S. 1997)).
354
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plaintiff [] challenges [] an unlawful practice that continues into
the limitations period.”361 The Court maintains that a defendant
engaging in a continuing series of infringing acts of the same or
similar kind commits “discrete acts independently actionable.”362
An initial infringing act, followed by continuing acts of the same
or similar kind will not constitute conduct cumulative in effect, the
Court’s description of the hostile environment claims pursued
under Title VII in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan.363 Previously, the Ninth Circuit included knowledge of
“impending copyright infringements” along with “knowledge of
actual infringement” to determine when the period to measure
delay for laches begins. 364 The Court declines to distinguish
between delay in bringing suit over infringing acts occurring only
once and those persisting over decades (and thus continually
impending). By minimizing the potential harm resulting from
allowing a plaintiff’s delayed claim to proceed, the Court
incentivizes copyright owners to withhold filing their claims,
encouraging increased delay in the assertion of rights in a work,
and engendering a climate of unpredictability.
The circumstances of Petrella’s delay in bringing suit fit those
of the hypothetical “inequitable” copyright owner imagined by
Judge Hand in Haas.365 Petrella, “the owner of a copyright, with
full notice of an intended infringement” since 1991, delayed
initiating litigation without reasonable cause until 2010.366 Petrella
owns one of the possible underlying Raging Bull copyrights as a
result of the Stewart v. Abend decision, which held that when an
author dies before the renewal period begins, his successors are
entitled to the renewal rights, even if the author assigned the
renewal rights to another party.367 Petrella stood “inactive” during
361

Id. (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380–81 (1982)).
Id. at *6 n.7 (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114–21
(2002)).
363
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 115.
364
Kling v. Hallmark Cards Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2000).
365
See Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
366
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. CV 09-72-GW (MANx), at 45a (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 3, 2010) (citing Danjaq, LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir.
2001)).
367
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
362
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this extended period of delay while Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the
“proposed infringer,” spent “large sums of money” on the
exploitation of Petrella’s father’s work.368 Petrella, “intervene[d]
only when [her] speculation . . . proved a success.” 369 In fact,
Petrella “testified that she refrained from filing suit at that time
[1991] because [Raging Bull] was not yet profitable.”370 Petrella’s
inaction evokes the plaintiff who “sleeps upon [her] rights,” 371
gauging profitability instead of promptly asserting her interest in
the work. The Court concludes that “there is nothing untoward
about waiting to see whether an infringer’s exploitation undercuts
the value of the copyrighted work, has no effect on the original
work, or even complements it.”372
Because Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. continues to exploit
Raging Bull and, arguably, the underlying works created by her
father, without laches, Petrella could have conceivably delayed for
years longer in initiating litigation. The Academy-Award winning
film 373 at the center of this controversy, widely considered by
critics as one of the greatest of all-time,374 remains popular to date.
The Film is held in high-regard in the motion picture industry and
is considered a significant work in American culture, deemed
“culturally, historically, and aesthetically significant” by the
United States Library of Congress.375 The Film continues to prove
368

Id.
Haas, 234 F. at 108.
370
Petrella, No. CV 09-72 (MANx).
371
S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 500 (1919) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
(quoting Hayward v. Eliot Nat'l Bank, 96 U.S. 611 (1877)).
372
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., No. 12-1315, 2014 WL 2011574, at *10
(U.S. May 19, 2014).
373
Raging Bull was nominated for eight Academy Awards and won two, including a
Best Actor award for Robert De Niro (in the role of Jake LaMotta) and Best Editor award
for Thelma Schoonmaker. See The 53rd Academy Awards (1981) Nominees and Winners,
THE OSCARS, http://www.oscars.org/awards/academyawards/legacy/ceremony/53rd.html
(last visited Jan. 21, 2014).
374
Raging Bull is ranked fourth on the 100 greatest movies of all-time, by a jury of
1,500 film artists, critics and historians. AFI’s 100 Years...100 Movies – 10th Anniversary
Edition, AFI.COM http://www.afi.com/100years/movies10.aspx (last visited Jan. 21,
2014).
375
Barbara Gamarekian, Library of Congress Adds 25 Titles to National Film Registry,
N.Y. TIMES, October 19, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/19/movies/library-ofcongress-adds-25-titles-to-national-film-registry.html.
369
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marketable to audiences. 376 Without laches, Petrella can delay
until she determines the most financially beneficial time to assert
her rights, filing “precisely when net revenues turned positive.”377
A copyright owner, free to delay legal action without consequence,
could put off negotiating a license until the alleged infringing party
“invests time, effort, and resources into making the derivative
product,” at which point the copyright owner will be in a position
of strength to “obtain favorable licensing terms through
settlement.”378 Though the Court posits that, “[i]f the rule were . . .
‘sue soon, or forever hold your peace,’ copyright owners would
have to mount a federal case fast to stop seemingly innocuous
infringements,”379 opening the door for unchecked delay promotes
an uncertain and needlessly hostile market where entities that
create and promote works would need to seek battery of
declaratory judgments before investing in the development of a
copyrighted work.
The Court finds that the “consequences of [Petrella’s] delay in
commencing suit” were not of “sufficient magnitude to warrant, at
the very outset of the litigation, curtailment of the relief equitably
awardable.”380 The Court, failing to identify harm analogous to the
“total destruction of the work” of New Era Publications
International 381 or injunctive relief that would “‘work an unjust
hardship’ upon defendants and third parties” like that in Chirco v.
Crosswinds Communities, Inc.,382 holds that the circumstances “are
not sufficiently extraordinary to justify threshold dismissal.”383 As
the case was remanded, the Court notes, “should Petrella
ultimately prevail on the merits, the district court, in determining
376

The film has been re-released in 25th Anniversary and 30th Anniversary special
edition DVDs. See Raging Bull 25th Anniversary Special Edition, THE DIGITAL FIX FILM
(Feb. 25, 2005, 2:00 PM), http://film.thedigitalfix.com/content/id/56279/raging-bull25th-anniversary-special-edition.html.
377
Petrella, 2014 WL 2011574, at *16.
378
Id.
379
Id. at *10.
380
Id. at *12.
381
Id. at *12–13 (citing New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576,
584–85 (2d Cir. 1989).
382
Id. at *12 (quoting Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir.
2007).
383
Id. at *13.

2014]

YOU NEVER GOT ME DOWN, DELAY

903

appropriate injunctive relief and assessing profits, may take into
account her delay in commencing suit.”384 The opinion states that
the district court “should closely examine MGM’s alleged reliance
on Petrella’s delay.” 385 As the defendant’s reliance on the
plaintiff’s conduct to its detriment is an element of estoppel,386 this
statement suggests that defendants aiming to invoke a defense
against the inequities previously addressed by laches must now
rely on equitable estoppel. In the dissenting opinion, Justice
Breyer notes, “[w]here due to the passage of time, evidence
favorable to the defense has disappeared or the defendant has
continued to invest in a derivative work, what misleading
representation by the plaintiff is there to stop?” 387 Short of
construing a plaintiff’s failure to file a claim with knowledge of
infringing acts as a misleading representation that he will never
file, this element appears absent in cases where the defendant
would have invoked laches. In carving out the “little place” for
laches in copyright claims, the Court, thinking another equitable
doctrine might fit, measured too small.388
CONCLUSION
The conflicts over the availability of laches come down to
conflicts over law and equity. The bright-line law of the statute of
limitations states the three-year time limit in which to bring a civil
claim of copyright infringement. The accompanying congressional
materials clearly set out the issues the statute of limitations
intended to resolve and the amendment’s purpose of establishing
national uniformity. Closer examination of the effects of this
uniformity when applied to continuing acts of infringement make
clear the need for the availability of laches. Because the statute of
limitations could effectively run forever on continuing

384
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infringements, the equitable doctrine of laches is beneficial to
mitigate the negative effects of a plaintiff’s delay.
The Petrella decision restricts the availability of laches to
extraordinary circumstances. The Court narrowly defines these
circumstances, nearly eliminating laches from copyright entirely.
The Court states that “[a]llowing Petrella’s suit to go forward . . .
will work no unjust hardship on innocent third parties, such as
consumers who have purchased copies of Raging Bull.” 389 The
troubling notion arises that the Court requires that sufficient harm
occur to the physical embodiments of the copyrighted expression
at issue for the extraordinary circumstances to exist. Injunctions to
pulp copies of the Bare-Faced Messiah book, tear down occupied
condominiums, or, Justice Ginsburg’s hypothetical seizure of
consumers’ copies of Raging Bull, comprise the total destruction of
work or unjust hardship of extraordinary circumstances. Given the
evolution of technology compelling copyrighted expression away
from physical copies, the Court’s holding renders a defendant
vulnerable to opportunistic plaintiffs in myriad scenarios already
easily imaginable. If, given Petrella’s lengthy delay and MetroGoldwyn-Mayer’s substantial investment, injunctive relief would
not work the unjust hardship upon defendants and third parties
necessary to constitute extraordinary circumstances, it is
foreseeable that this decision’s extraordinary circumstances
standard aims to effectively eliminate defenses against inequitable
delay altogether.
Fairness dictates that laches should be more widely available
than this decision allows. Without laches, potential claimants can
delay initiating litigation, waiting for an opportune time to
capitalize on another’s toil. The adverse effect this delay could
have on those parties investing resources in copyrighted works is
substantial. The motions for declaratory judgments and defenses
against long-incubating claims will abound. This increase in
litigation can only offer limited certainty. Without any assurance
over an indefinite period of time that an infringement claim will
not appear, parties who would traditionally license and exploit
copyrighted works may hesitate in doing so out of fear that a
389

Id. at *13.
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potential claimant could attempt to assert rights in a profitable
work at any future point. A decrease in the use of copyrighted
material would negatively affect parties producing, distributing,
and exploiting copyrighted works, who may find themselves
limited to using economically advantageous alternatives, and
creators, who may find themselves out of work. The Petrella
decision will likely have a detrimental effect on the promotion of
the progress of authors’ works in the future, working an unjust
hardship on the potential defendants involved in the development
of copyrightable works and third-party consumers left with
diminished options. Non-existence of works of the same caliber as
Raging Bull nets the same result as total destruction.

